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The Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized countries – the so-called “Annex B parties” – to fulfil their commitments to greenhouse gas abatement partly through reducing emissions in other countries where such measures are cheaper. The kind of flexibility, which enables industrialized countries to comply with their commitments at lower costs, is defined in the Protocol under the following so-called “Kyoto mechanisms”:
	joint implementation (JI) under Article 6;
	the clean development mechanism (CDM) under Article 12; and/or
	international emissions trading (IET) under Article 17. 
IET uses a top-down approach by calculating reductions in emissions on the basis of national commitments. The legal text of Article 17 indicates that Annex B governments could trade parts of their assigned amounts. A sovereign government could decide to split up its assigned amounts by allocating permits to individual companies (or sectors), enabling them to trade emissions domestically. 
JI and CDM differ from IET, because the former are project-based mechanisms with an investor receiving credits for the emission reductions achieved in the host country. In principle, the emission reductions in such projects are measured bottom-up from a baseline that estimates what the emissions at the projects location would have been if the project had not taken place.
Although both JI and the CDM are project-based, they differ in that a JI host country has an emission target whereas a CDM host country does not. This means that there is a stronger incentive for a CDM host country to overestimate emission reductions by inflating project baselines (in order to claim more credits). In contrast, a JI host has an assigned amount and runs the risk of being in non-compliance if it transfers too many credits. 
Theoretical economic models predict large cost savings from emissions trading. A market for trading carbon emissions can work well provided that it is designed adequately. In particular, it requires the participation of private entities, clear trading and enforcement rules, as well as information and trade facilities (such as clearinghouse) to avoid market power, to strengthen compliance and to keep transaction costs low, for instance. 
The Kyoto mechanisms lower the costs of reducing emissions, but several political, environmental and institutional barriers complicate their implementation, such as those related to private-sector participation, project baseline determination and hot-air trading. 


